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Recent changes in military retirement will reduce benefits to members entering
service after July 31, 1986. These changes may have effects on Navy tactical pilot
retention. This thesis seeks to measure retention effects resulting from retirement
revision. A binary-response logistic-regression model was applied to cross-sectional
data obtained from randomly selected Navy tactical aviators to evaluate possible
determinants of their retention choice behavior. This data analysis suggests that the
Military Retirement Act of 1986 will contribute to a decrease in retention rates. Job
security, tastes for military life, airline hiring rates, spouse employment, and pay were
also found to be significantly (1%) correlated with retention.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. THE PROBLEM
In 1986, the United States Congress passed and President Reagan signed Public
Law 99-348, the Military Retirement Act of 1986. The act effectively reduces retired
pay of people who enter service alter July 31, 1986, by more than 22 percent. This
change may have an adverse impact upon retention.
The United States Navy aviation community has experienced difficulty in the
past in retaining adequate numbers of trained tactical air pilots 1 beyond their minimum
service requirement. The result has been shortages of pilots in mid-career grades. These
shortages have financial and readiness costs associated with them.
The new retirement law may cause Navy tactical pilot retention rates to drop to
unacceptable levels in terms of Naval aviation force objectives. This result would have
serious implications for manpower planning, resource allocation, and Naval air
readiness.
B. BACKGROUND
Public Law 99-348, the Military Retirement Act of 1986 had its seminal
beginnings on September 30, 1976, when Democratic Congressman Les Aspin of
Wisconsin took the floor of the United States House of Representatives and remarked:
I am today introducing a package of bills designed to reform and refine the whole
system of militarv compensation. 'I he first (bin) concerns pay and allowances . . .
.The second bilf involves military pension reform. This legislation provides that
no one who has performed his twenty years can be cast out into the streets and
penury. At the same time we will not 'be blithely mailing huge 'pension' checks to
relatively young men who have gone on to well paying fobs." \Rc[. 1]
Congressman Aspin's remarks foreshadowed a determined effort on his part to
"reform" the military retirement system. His efforts were largely unsuccessful until 1984
when the Democratic House caucus voted to remove Congressman Melvin Price of
Illinois as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Aspin was voted to
succeed Price as Chairman and it was from this forum that the Representative from
.
]
Tactical aircraft are attack and fighter jets operated principally from aircraft
carriers.
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Wisconsin took legislative steps that would culminate in Public Law 99-348, the
Military Retirement Act of 1986.
To fully understand the importance of this change in benefits, it is necessary to
understand how and why the system evolved. The best vantage point for this
understanding is through historical context.
1. History of U.S. Military Retirement Pay
a. English Precedence and Colonial Practice
Early English military pension practice is of particular interest as a
precursor of philosophies which influenced legislative action in the American colonies
and, later, in the United States.
In 1592, the British parliament passed the first law for the relief of maimed
or disabled soldiers. The statute provided for an annual pension to be funded by
localities where soldiers were pressed into service. In 1697, England established a
pension system for officers that allowed half-pay for retired commissioned members.
Officers covered under this system were placed on half-pay, were liable to recall to
service in time of war, and were subject to military law.
During the Indian conflicts, English colonialists in America quite naturally
followed prevailing practice in England. The General Assembly of the Royal Colony of
Virginia voted in 1644 to provide pensions for soldiers disabled while defending the
colonies from Indian attacks. Other colonies followed suit and enlarged coverage to
include widows and orphans of those killed while in service to the colonies. Generally,
pensions were limited to those who were totally unable to provide for themselves while.
in some instances, pensions proportionate to the level of disability were awarded.
b. Revolutionary War Pension Acts
Based on the long practice of England and her colonies, provisions for the
military in the newly formed United States took a form quite similar to British usage.
During the progress of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress passed
legislation that dealt with the pension question in two ways. First, half-pay for life was
promised to those disabled. Second, half-pay for life was to be granted to officers to be
paid, upon their retirement, to all who should serve to the end of the war [Ref. 2: p. 19].
Unfortunately, the newly formed Continental Congress did not have the financial
means to completely pay or outfit soldiers in the field, let alone retirees. Promissory
notes were issued immediately following the war and disbanding of the Army in 1783.
Despite this gesture, no provision was made by Congress for payment of principal or
interest until 1791 by which time many of the certificates had been sold by needy
officers to speculators at a deep discount to their face value.
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Thus, the first years of our nation's existence demonstrated attitudes of the
Congress toward the question of pensions based on prior Federal military service.
There seemed to be general agreement that some form of compensation should be
made available to those maimed or disabled during war. However, the reluctance of
Congress to fund lifetime half-pay pensions for officers based strictly on service during
the war had a political as well as financial underpinning. Opposition to officer pensions
after demobilization was, in part, based on fear of creating an aristocracy of retired
officers such as existed in European monarchies. A privileged class, it was thought, was
not consistent with truly democratic ideals. By 1820, however, with the nation's
treasury solvent and tariff-generated revenues producing a surplus, Congress felt
compelled to fund retirement pensions at halfpay for surviving officers who had served
during the Revolutionary War.
By the early nineteenth century two distinct concepts had been established
which were later to become part of the modern United States military retirement law:
disability pensions to war veterans and retirement pensions based on service alone.
c. The Civil War Period
On August 3, 1862, President Lincoln signed legislation regarded as the first
universal retirement law for all services. This Civil War law constitutes the legislative
base of the current Uniformed Services Retirement System. It was designed to provide
for retirement of Regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers who had engaged in
military service as a life's work and who had become unfit for active field duty.
Provisions for retirement of enlisted personnel on this basis was not enacted until a
later date. The purpose of this law was to increase the efficiency of the professional
officer corps by removing those who had become unable to actively carry out their
duties, particularly in the field and at sea. It was common for officers to serve until
eighty years of age or older. Many of these senior officers were unable to function
effectively in the field and were placed on leave or furlough with pay when their units
were engaged in campaigns. Under this new law, officers who retired were to receive
seventy-five percent of active duty pay, continued subject to trial by courts-martial,
and remained subject to active duty recall upon the President's discretion. Similar
provisions have been retained in permanent law to the present.
There are two types of Armed service in the United States: regular and reserve.
Regular service is in standing units. Reserve service is in units that tram on a part-time
basis but are subject to mobilization when required.
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Civil War demobilization resulted in the establishment by Congress in 1870
of two more fundamental tenets of current law. The first permitted voluntary-
retirement of officers after thirty years of service upon approval by the President and
the second fixed retired pay at 75 percent of the officer's grade.
The first non-disability retirement law for Marine Corps and Army enlistees
was established in 1885. Much like the officer's law. it had provisions for thirty year
retirement at 75 percent of base pay with supplemental allowances in lieu of food and
quarters. Interestingly, Navy enlistees were excluded until 1899. at which time they
were brought under the law. The initial exclusion of Navy enlistees resulted from
political bickering arising over the Navy internal pension fund's abundant coffers.
(1) The Xavy Internal Pension Fund. The Navy pension fund had its
origin in measures taken by the Continental Congress in 1775, which specified that a
portion of prize proceeds taken by Navy ships be used to pay disability benefits to
Navy officers and seamen and death benefits to widows and orphans of Navymen who
died in service. With ever an eye toward economy, Congress required that any benefits
received by seamen from Federal disability pensions be offset by benefits attributable
to the Navy fund.
As might be expected, the size of the Navy fund tended to rise during
wars as prize volume increased and decline between wars as increased benefits were
distributed to Navy war veterans and survivors. Due to a decreasing flow of prize
money resulting from the changing nature of war at sea, the income from Navy
pension fund investments had become inadequate by 1880 to satisfy benefit
entitlements of Navy and Marine personnel. By 1914, annual Navy pension costs
approximated S 6 million and only about S350,000 of that cost was borne by the
pension fund (Ref. 2: p.54). The difference was provided from the Federal treasury.
d. The World War I Period
By the middle of World War I, both the Navy and Army were experiencing
a promotion stagnation problem. The presence of older and often infirmed officers was
to have been reduced by Civil War era legislation designed to "weed out" older, less
efficient officers by allowing for voluntary retirement with pay. Unfortunately,
Congress refused to fund the law. The vehicle used for fiscal circumvention was a
legislative constraint placed on the numbers of officers who could be carried on
retirement rolls. Many officers who applied for retirement were frequently turned down.
Thus, while making legal provisions for voluntary retirement, Congress generally did
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not permit it. By 1914, problems of an older, inefficient officer corps continued to
plague the services.
Congress and the Navy took, the lead in attacking the stagnation problem.
On August 29, 1919, Congress passed an act that was to be the forerunner of modern
officer personnel management. The act established for the first time in permanent law
the principle of promotion of the best qualified officers of the Navy. Selection boards
were mandated for promotion to Lieutenant Commander through Admiral. Those who
failed to select by a certain age were placed on the retired list. Officers involuntarily
retired received 2.5 percent of base pay per year of service, not to exceed 75 percent.
This new law reflected an increasing awareness of the need for an adequate flow of
promotions to assure vigor and vitality within the officer corps of the Navy. Congress
recognized the interdependence between promotion systems and retirement law and
acted to integrate the two.
Retirement pay computation provisions of the Act of August 29, 1916
incorporated a basic formula which has remained a part of the Uniformed Services
Retirement System. This law recognized the concept of retired pay related to length of
service as well as grade, using the 2.5 percent times years of service times retired grade
formula.
e. Between the World Wars
Between World War I and World War II both the Army and the Navy
continued to experience promotion stagnation problems. By 1935, a 'bulge' existed in
the 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 ranks which resulted from large numbers of reserve officers
entering service during World War I and subsequently augmented 3 into the Regular
force. By 1940, it was predicted, the average age of Army Colonels would be sixty-two
[Ref. 3]. With hostilities imminent, clearly a need existed to vitalize the officer corps.
Vigorous and alert leadership would be needed if the military were to undertake rapid
development of the force.
The Act of June 23, 1938 made substantial changes in the Navy's
promotion and retirement laws. Both age-in-grade and service-in-grade were
abandoned. Provision was made for 0-3's and 0-4's twice failing to select for promotion
to be honorably discharged with severance pay equal to two years base pay. Captains
not selected for promotion by the time they had served thirty years, Commanders
Augmentation is the process where a reserve officer is given permanent status as
a Regular officer.
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completing twenty-eight years, and Lieutenant Commanders who had been continued
and completing twenty-six years, would be retired. Promotion selection boards were
given authority to recommend unsatisfactory officers for discharge from service. For
the first time, this act provided for the voluntary retirement of Regular officers on
completion of twenty years of active commissioned service, upon their own application.
These were sweeping changes, but necessary, Congress felt, to ensure a youthful, vital
Navy officer corps. Many fundamental precepts of this act have been carried forward
into current law. [Ref. 4]
/. The Post World War II Period
World War II had demonstrated the need for a youthful, vigorous force. To
ensure this vitality and to create an effective promotion system, an elimination and a
voluntary, involuntary retirement procedure had to be developed. Importantly, it was
felt, such a system should protect the interests and entitlements of the individual
service member. With this criterion in mind, Congress passed the Officer Personnel
Act of August 7, 1947. This law established a permanent promotion system for the
Regular armed forces and changed the Army and Air Force systems of promotion by
seniority to a selection board system much like that of the Navy. Significantly, the act
sought to force attrition in higher ranks as a means of removing older officers and
bringing the most capable younger officers along to higher rank at an earlier age.
These were the lessons of a hard-fought war; a conflict which taxed the stamina of
many of our senior military officers. This legislation fixed by law for the first time the
number of officers who might serve in any one grade and prescribed the maximum
number of years an officer could be retained on active duty in a specified grade. For
nearly thirty-three years, the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was the legal authority for
officer promotions and involuntary retirement systems for the armed forces.
g. The Advent ofDOPMA
After experience with the force management provisions of the Act of 1947
and recognizing that officers in different branches of service were treated differently,
Congress acted to provide uniform retirement authority. The Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) made several significant changes. First, tenure
was denied for 0-4 and 0-3 grades who, not being eligible for retirement, are twice
passed over in selection for promotion. Provisions were made for continuation of those
officers, however, by action of a special board. Second, officers in pay grades 0-8, 0-7,
and 0-6 who have at least four years in grade and are not on a list recommended for
15
promotion along with 0-5's who have twice failed selection may be considered for
involuntary retirement by board action. In addition, the act established a three year
time-in-grade requirement for voluntary retirement [Ref. 5]. This act is seen as further
strengthening the hand of force planners in an effort by Congress to maintain a
youthful, more capable force.
2. History of Post Retirement Adjustment of Retired Pay
The foregoing narrative of how the United States military retirement system
evolved tends to illustrate the forces that shaped the current system. The lessons of
conflict were clear. A youthful force is needed and the retirement system evolved,
partly, as a means to bring that about. Therefore, the present retirement system is only
partially a pension; it serves also as a force management tool.
There is a second dimension to the military retirement debate: to what extent
should retiree pay be protected against a rising cost-of-living? To place that question in
proper perspective, it is necessary to examine its history.
a. The Early Years
From 1S61 to 1958, increases in retired pay were directly linked to active
duty pay increases. If active duty pay rose a certain percentage, retired pay rose an
equal amount at the same time. That practice was discontinued with the Act of May
1958 (public law 85-422) when Congress realized that a single 6 percent cost of living
increase would cost only S35 million, as opposed to S65 million for linking the retired
pay to active duty pay.
With the passage of the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963 (public law
88-132), adjustments in retired pay of members of the armed services were tied directly
to changes in the Consumer Price Index. The retired pay adjustment formula of 1963
was altered by the Act of August 21, 1965 (public law 89-132). The new mechanism
granted cost-of-living increases whenever the Consumer Price Index rose more than 3
percent and remained at that level for more than three months. The benefit increase
was equal to the percentage rise in the Consumer Price Index. [Ref. 6]
b. The Later Years'. 1970 to 1985
Liberalization of cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) reached a nadir in
October 1976, when Congress amended the law to allow for COLA payments twice
yearly. This had the effect of increasing the rate of compounded growth in retirement
annuities. For example, a 5 percent increase granted once a year is an annual effective
rate of 5.00 percent. However, a 2.5 percent increase granted twice yearly is an annual
effective rate of 5.063 percent.
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From 1973 to 1981, COLA increases for retirement pay exceeded active
duty pay increases (see Figure 1.1). This produced two noticeable effects. First, active
duty officers began retiring when eligible at much higher rates than previous. Second,
Congress recognized the inequity and took, action to slow growth in retirement
COLAS. In August 1981, Public Law 97-35 reduced the payment of retired pay
COLAS to once a year.
Further steps were taken by Congress in April 1984, to slow the growth of
retirement COLAs. The new law permanently altered existing legislation by changing
the way benefits were calculated. The net effect was to reduce the COLA percentage
below the Consumer Price Index. Ultimately, the 1984 COLA payment was eliminated
entirely.
In 1985, the passage of the Deficit Reduction and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) struck a further blow to retired pay













Figure 1.1 Comparison of Retired vs Active Pay Increase: 1974 to 1981.
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II. LITERATURE SEARCH
The volume of published research in military manpower issues is increasing. This
increase may be at least partly due to the maturing of the all-volunteer-force (AVF).
Until the AVF was created, the United States relied exclusively on conscription for
armed forces manpower. In terms of personnel costs, conscription is thought to be a
lower cost alternative to a standing volunteer force. As wage (and price) levels rose in
the decade since the beginning of the AVF, military pay was increased principally as a
means to compete in the labor market. Growth in the military pay portion of the
Defense budget has created considerable debate over the affordability of an AVF.
Increasing emphasis has been placed on achieving better economical use of manpower
dollars. This dialogue has given impetus to more rigorous analysis of military retention
issues. Researchers have attempted to model individual choice behavior and, by doing
so, hope to better understand behavioral effects of policy initiatives.
Four studies have emerged from the plethora of retention research that appear to
be useful here: Gotz and McCall [Ref. 7], Warner [Ref. 8], Slackman [Ref. 9], and Gotz
and McCall [Ref. 10].
A. THE ISSUE OF MONETARY VS. NON-MONETARY FACTORS
The studies mentioned previously are characterized by their development of
behavioral retention models. Such an approach has strong economic foundations, for
the primary objective of retention analysis must focus on incentive effects of alternative
courses of action. For example, one might wish to determine the net impact of a
specific change in compensation policy on force structure. Basic economic assumptions
underly such analysis. The most straightforward example is recognition of the service
member as a rational actor who seeks to maximize his expected utility. The studies
reviewed in this thesis all incorporate this logic set in their models. However,
experience tells us monetary return is not always the primary motivation in an
individual retention decision. Acknowledgement must be given to the role non-
monetary factors play. Importantly, the effects of such variables must be estimated
with greater accuracy. The exclusion of non-pecuniary factors from the cited studies
has been shown to diminish the explanatory power of their models.
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A primary non-monetary factor is an individual's taste for military life. A
person's attitude toward the military lifestyle may be a factor in an individual stay or
leave decision. Therefore, at a given decision point, those with greater tastes for the
service are more likely to stay. As the cohort ages the percentage of individuals with
higher tastes increases. It is widely observed that retention rates increase as years-of-
service (YOS) increases. It is reasonable to conclude from this relationship that
individuals with higher tastes have a higher probability of staying. Self-selection is a
process where individuals remove themselves from an occupation as a result of their
differing affinities to the job's characteristics. Thus, the increase in retention as YOS
rises due to self-selection is distinct from any increase in the financial incentive to stay.
The models reviewed in this chapter vary in ability to capture the impact of taste on
retention. Failure to estimate the separate effects of individual behavior by people with
different tastes will create difficulties in estimating retention. In examining the effects of
changes in military compensation, retention rates will be underestimated in the earlier
years and overestimated in the later years. This is because people with higher tastes are
less sensitive to changes in financial incentives.
Another non-pecuniary factor examined in varying degrees by these studies is
random shock effects. Random shocks are those events occurring during an officer's
career prompting a decision to leave the service despite strong propensities to remain.
A common type of random shock would be a job transfer to a location perceived by
the service member to be less than desirable. Because the evidence tells us retention
probability approaches one as YOS increases, there should be no losses in the senior
year groups. But, in fact, there are. Such losses can be attributed to random shocks.
Incorporating this variable should enhance a model's predictive power.
B. THE PVCOL MODEL
The PVCOL, or present value of the cost of leaving, model attempts to predict
rational economic behavior by analyzing income streams available to a service member
facing a stay or leave decision. The individual has several choices: (1) He can stay in
service, retire when eligible, and receive retirement pay; (2) He can stay one more year,
resign, and work in the private sector; (3) He can stay "n" more years, resign, and work
in the private sector. The person facing the stay or leave decision must analyze the
different income streams available from each course of action and make the following
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decision: Which alternative maximizes my income? The PVCOL model makes the
evaluation by comparing the present value of each income stream. The difference
between the present value of income from staying now and that of staying to the next
decision point is termed "the present value of the cost of leaving." Put simply, if future
financial returns are greater from staying in the military than from leaving, the PVCOL
model will predict a "stay" decision.
Several assumptions are made in this model. First, it is assumed that an
individual's alternative income streams are known with certainty. Second, an
assumption is made that an individual's discount rate is known. These two assumptions
are key elements in building the "rational man" model and as such, prevail throughout
the four models under review. Such assumptions are liable for criticism on two
grounds: perfect knowledge of future income streams and valid determination of an
individual's discount rate over time. Gilman [Ref. 11,] Cylke [Ref. 12], and Black
[Ref. 13] have attempted to determine individual discount rates with varying results.
For example, the study by Black estimated an officer's mean discount rate to be 10.3
percent with a 90 percent confidence interval of 8.5 to 12.4 percent. The same research
estimated the mean enlisted rate to be 12.5 percent with a 9.8 to 15.0 percent
confidence interval [Ref. 13: p.36]. With wide variation evident in empirical studies, it
is not particularly persuasive to argue that individual discount rates can be adequately
modeled. However, criticism of the PVCOL model on this basis will be left to other
writers. This thesis will focus on a more significant problem in the model: omitted
variables bias.
The major limitation of the PVCOL model is bias introduced by omitting the
taste variable. The average value of an individual's taste for military service, as noted
earlier, rises with years of service. The present value of the cost of leaving also rises
with years of service. Since both increasing tastes and an increasing cost of leaving lead
to higher retention, a positive bias in the cost of leaving estimate could result if tastes
are ignored. Therefore, this model is likely to overpredict effects of monetary changes
on retention rates.
C. THE PERCEIVED PAY MODEL
The Perceived Pay model (PPM) results from work done by Slackman [Ref. 9] to
improve on PVCOL methodology. The PPM makes a comparison of discounted future
21
earnings indigenous to alternative courses of action. The PPM differs from the PVCOL
model in the manner in which the earnings comparison is made. The PVCOL calculates
returns to staying by analyzing the difference between the present value of leaving now
and leaving at each of 'n' future years. The PPM uses a weighted average of the
present value of staying until each of the future years. The weights are an individual's
probability of remaining in the military until each of the future years. Perceived pay is
then derived as the quotient using the weighted average as the numerator and the
present value of future income from leaving now as the denominator.
The PPM addresses the taste question by developing a mathematical
approximation of individual proclivities for military service. The expression represents
the cumulative probability of leaving until the time a stay or leave decision must be
made. The use of cumulative probability recognizes the average tastes distribution
within a cohort.
Retention is estimated using a logistic distribution:
r. = l/{l + e-<Po
+ PlXi + JVcumiV} (eqn2.1)
where:
r.
= retention rate at decision point i.
X-
= perceived pay at decision point i.
cumrt. = cumulative retention probability at decision point i.
Po' Pi* P2
= Parameters t0 be estimated.
The manner in which random shocks are treated is the major limitation of this
model. The PPM incorporates random shocks in the regression equation error term.
This requires an assumption that individuals do not integrate the possibility of future
random shocks into their current decisions. This assumption suggests that even though
military members experience random shocks at various decision points, they behave as
if there would be no more random shocks in the future. It is probable that military
members do consider future random shocks in their decisions. By not integrating such
considerations in the model, significant explanatory power may be lost.
22
D. THE ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING MODEL
The annualized cost of leaving model (ACOL) was first described by John
Warner (Ref. 8). This model, like the others, seeks to evaluate the effects of changes in
compensation on retention. ACOL builds on previous research by incorporating
strengths of the PVCOL and PPM models while attempting to overcome their
limitations. Similar in theoretical construct to the earlier models, ACOL describes
income maximizing, rational economic behavior.
ACOL derives a maximum military-civilian pay differential in much the same
manner as the previous models. The significant difference is the method used to
compare the value of staying in the military or leaving and taking a civilian job. Both
PPM and PVCOL make a comparison of the present value of leaving at each of the
future decision points with the returns to staying at each of these future points. ACOL
deviates from this methodology and simply derives a cost of leaving which is the
maximum military-civilian pay differential from remaining in the service. While both
the PPM and PVCOL model's time horizon is the future decision point that yields the
greatest differential, ACOL focuses on those future years of service over which an
annual cost of leaving is maximized. This cost of leaving is standardized by dividing by
the number of years over which ACOL is maximized. For example, let's assume the
present value of staying in the service for four years then leaving is SI 00,000; for eight
years is S200,000; for sixteen years is S300,000; for twenty years is S600,000; and for
twenty-four years is S400,000. The cost of leaving at the end of the first four years is
calculated in Figure 2.1 As can be shown in the calculation, the model predicts a
person should remain in service until YOS twenty, at which point the annualized cost
of leaving is maximized.
ACOL incorporates tastes into the calculus by assigning the taste factor a
monetary value. By using this method, ACOL is directed toward those who are on the
margin of the stay or leave decision, not those who are taste neutral. Following is an
example showing the relation of taste value to the decision to stay or leave.
From Figure 2.1:
Maximum ACOL = S 31,250 at YOS 20
Value of Indifference =
Taste Value = -31,250
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Years of Service
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25 ,000 16 ,667 31 ,250 15 ,000
The decision rule is:
Taste value > -31,250
Taste value = -31,250
Taste value < -31,250




Because ACOL does not allow tastes to be individually observed, proxy measures
are necessary to determine the estimated relationship between retention and the
monetary value of tastes. It is assumed that tastes in a given cohort are distributed
logistically. The model parameters thus can be estimated by logistic regression. The
equation is:







= retention rate at decision point i




The major limitation with ACOL is its orientation towards only those who are
on the margin. While this is a logical construct if the sole purpose is to consider effects
of financial incentives, it ignores random shocks. In the earlier discussion of random
shocks, it was noted that future unknown events have an influence on retention. A
service member with high tastes for the military (not on the margin) may be induced by
a negative shock to leave. Therefore, consideration of the effects of random shocks
must be integrated into a model to improve its predictability.
A secondary limitation with both ACOL and the other models is the
assumption that an individual has knowledge of future income streams. It is difficult
to predict the future with any measure of confidence. Further, it is reasonable to
assume that service members form expectations about future civilian income rather
than calculate actual amounts. Implicit in any expectation is an element of uncertainty.
Consequently, ACOL et al make assumptions exact in nature in an uncertain
environment.
Estimation of civilian income opportunities is another elusive factor and has
been the subject of many studies. Cooper [Ref. 14,15] has done the most extensive
analysis. His research suggests that military retirees have higher incomes than non-
military retirees. The opposite conclusion was reached by Raduchel et al [Ref. 16] who
found that retirees earned substantially less than comparable civilians. Others,
including Danzon [Ref. 17] and DeTray [Ref. 18] offer inconclusive evidence. There
appears to be no clear consensus as to what the quantitative dimension of post-military
civilian earnings may be. Thus, it is unlikely that all service members share the same
expectations. The ACOL assumption of constant future income streams in cross-
sectional analysis may be flawed.
a. The Assumption of Constant Discount Rates Over Time
Implicit in models that discount future earnings is an interest rate
assumption. To demonstrate the significance of the discount rate, the present value
formula is illustrated. The formula for present value is derived from the formula for
compound interest:
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S = P(l + i)n (eqn2.3)
where
S = compound sum
P = principal amount
i = interest rate
n = number of periods
For example, the future value (S) of amount S1000 (P) at an annual rate of
10 % (i) for four (n) years is:
From equation 2.3 :
S = SlOOO(l.lO)4 = SI,464 (eqn2.4)
Determining the present value of a future amount is the inverse of the
compound sum calculation.
From equation 2.3 by manipulation:
S = P(l + i)n
P = S(l/(l + i)n } (eqn2.5)
Using equation 2.5
,
the present value (P) of S1464 received four years into
the future, with a 10% interest (discount) rate is S1000 today:
P = S1464{1;(1 + .10)4 }
P = S1464(.683)
= S1000
The implicit assumption in this calculation is that the annual amounts are
reinvested at the same rate. Fremgen [Ref. 19] points out this implication and notes the
difficulty in predicting future interest rates. The assumption by ACOL et al of constant
discount rates over time injects a bias in their methodology relative to the uncertainty
in forecasting future events.
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E. THE DYNAMIC RETENTION MODEL
The Dynamic Retention Model (DRM) is associated with work by Gotz and
McCall (Ref. 10). It represents a further step in an ongoing evolution of retention
modeling. The DRM answers criticism of PPM, PVCOL, and ACOL by incorporating
tastes and random shocks into its equation. DRM, unlike ACOL, recognizes that the
distribution of tastes varies over years of service rather than remaining constant. By
following the distribution of tastes at each year of service, DRM offers a better
explanation of why retention rates tend to rise as YOS increases. Further, DRM
establishes a connection between retention rates at year i with pay policies in periods
prior to year i. For example, an increase in compensation at year i-1 will tend to
increase retention rates at year i. The rise in retention, however, will come in part from
people who have lower average tastes but are induced by the pay raise to remain in
service. Therefore, the average tastes distribution from all who stayed would be lower
than if no raise in year i-l had been offered. DRM is the only model that implicitly
incorporates this linkage.
1. DRM and Random Shocks
The Dynamic Retention Model assumes that service members know random
shocks may alter their future behavior. DRM models this assumption by integrating
the possibility of future random shocks into calculations of a weighted average of
staying in service until each of the future decision points. The use of a weighted
average is similar to the Perceived Pay Model methodology. However, DRM views the
weights as not only the odds of staying to a future point but also an individual's
probability of not experiencing future random shocks. This concept has strong intuitive
appeal. For example, an officer with high tastes who remained in service despite a
perceived undesireable job assignment would certainly consider the probability of
another negative shock in the future when confronting the stay or leave decision.
2. Criticism of DRM
Criticism of the DRM concerns its complexity, particularly the extensive data
requirements. Estimation of the DRM requires longitudinal data which presents a more
difficult problem than cross-sectional data. Further, time-series analysis must be used
with longitudinal data and this adds to the complexity and expense. While DRM
appears to be the most theoretically sound of the models examined, its complexity and
data requirements could discourage its widespread use [Ref. 20].
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III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The principal research objective is to determine the effects of recent military
retirement compensation changes on retention of Navy tactical pilots. A secondary
objective is estimation of Navy tactical pilot retention determinants as a means of
establishing a framework for evaluating changes in manpower policy. The research
design must, of course, be both internally and externally valid.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
The retention effects of a change in military compensation policy can be easily
measured after the fact. Continuation4 rates for the period following a change are
observed and compared to rates in the period prior to the policy change. Estimates
made before the fact are considerably more difficult to make. Because retention
models try to quantify human behavior in economic terms, assumptions regarding
individual behavior are necessary. Analysis of economic behavior seeks to reveal
relationships between sets of independent characteristics and observed outcomes (in
this case, retention). Once relationships are estimated, predictions based on these
estimates are possible. Thus, given parameters of the observed relationship, effects of a
change in this mapping can be estimated before the fact.
1. The Estimation Problem
One research objective of this thesis is to analyze retention outcomes for a
specific population relative to a change in compensation policy (retirement pay).
Unfortunately most existing models (ACOL, et al) were estimated from aggregate data,
which limits their utility in this research. Estimates produced from aggregate data are
not useful in examining specific sub-groups of a population. For example, when
forecasting retention effects of proposed reductions in military retirement pay for a
Department of Defense study, the ACOL model used a baseline current continuation
rate for officers of 92.5 percent at the 8 YOS cell [Ref. 21]. The rate for Navy tactical
continuation rates are calculated by (1-loss rate) where loss rates are the
percentage of the previous year's active duty total in a given YOS cell that are not on
active duty the following year.
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pilots was 46 percent. Further, the DOD aggregate data included Warrant and Limited
Duty officers, both of which have considerable prior enlisted service. There is no
homogeneity between Warrant Officers, for example, and tactical pilots. Clearly, the
use of aggregate data can be inappropriate in focusing on specific sub-populations. To
do so assumes constant tastes across job categories.
In examining a specific occupation it was necessary to construct a
mathematical expression capturing indigenous relationships implicit in Navy tactical
pilot retention behavior. Estimation parameters are often derived using data which
links stay or leave behavior with individual characteristics. Historical data bases
generally provide a good source and, indeed, provided data for the ACOL model.
However, use of historical data is inappropriate for this study because of
"grandfathering" provisions of the Military Retirement Act of 1986. The new law
reduces retirement pay approximately 22 percent for all service members joining after
July 31, 19S6 [Ref. 22]. Those that were on active duty or were in a pre-commissioning
training status prior to July 31, 1986, are not affected. Because the first Navy pilots
subject to the revised law will not reach the first retention decision point until 1992,
their choice behavior can not be observed. Thus it is necessary to use planned behavior
for estimation. Determining retention plans becomes the key consideration in research
design and a primary element affecting the internal validity of this research.
C. DATA COLLECTION
The most effective method with which to obtain information on planned
retention is simply to ask individuals their intentions. Three general methods exist with
which to query a person: questionnaire, oral, or observational. As noted, it is not
possible to use observational methods in this research. Pilots who will be affected by
the new law have not reached their first retention decision point. Oral interviews also
present limitations. While it would be desirable to interview each pilot, such a method
is not practical. Cost and time constraints preclude use of this reliable technique.
Questionnaires offer many advantages. The most obvious is cost. Moser and
Kalton [Ref. 23] point out the expense of printing questionnaires and distributing them
to large numbers of people is considerably less than that of interviewing similar
numbers of people. In the context of this thesis design, questionnaire use provides an
additional advantage: it allows the researcher to query individuals who work unusual
hours. Berdie and Anderson [Ref. 24] point out that researchers conducting personal
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interviews frequently have trouble contacting people not in their office during normal
hours. Questionnaires delivered to their home or office allow respondents to complete
the survey at their leisure thus improving the response rate. An advantage like that is
important to this study. Navy pilots do not keep regular hours and frequently, their
office is in an airborne jet aircraft.
Questionnaires, therefore, were selected as the means of data collection. Goode
and Hatt [Ref. 25] observe that the use of questionnaires in research is based on one
basic, underlying assumption: the respondent will give truthful answers. The issue
becomes one of how accurately actual retention is measured by an individual's stated
intentions.
D. RELIABILITY OF STATED RETENTION BEHAVIOR
An important problem is to assess the reliability of stated retention behavior as a
predictor of future behavior. Chow and Polich [Ref. 26] found a high correlation
between stated and observed behavior with respect to first term reenlistment. This
conclusion was reached by comparing stated intentions in the 1976 DOD Survey of
Officers and Enlisted Personnel with actual results taken from the DOD master and
loss file for March, 1977. The Chow and Polich data is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF STATED INTENTIONS TO ACTUAL BEHAVIOR
Survey Response Actual Percentage Reenlisting
Very Likely 81.6%
Undecided, but likely 60.6%
Undecided, but not likely 27.1%
Not reenlisting 06.2%
Hiller [Ref. 27] verifies the Chow and Polich work by looking at the statistical
significance of their correlation coefficients. Hiller concludes that stated intentions are
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accurate predictors of retention and, importantly, planned behavior is directly
proportional to observed behavior. Put simply, service members do what they say.
E. THE SURVEY SAMPLE
A primary consideration underlying the selection of a sample group was the
research objective: the effects of changes in retirement pay on retention of Navy
tactical pilots. In order for inferences to be made correctly about a specific population,
therefore, the underlying sample group must be representative of the larger population.
Obviously, the sample should be drawn from Navy tactical pilots.
At this point a special problem arose: who should be sampled - pilots currently
on active duty and 'grandfathered' or prospective pilots yet to be commissioned who
would serve under the new law? The decision was made to use current force members.
The rejection of the use of prospective officers was based on two considerations;
practicality and occupational cognizance.
During the time this thesis research was conducted (July 1986), prospective
aviators had not entered the force yet 5 . It was impractical to query potential fliers
because this group was unavailable.
1. Occupational Cognizance
Even assuming potential aviators could be found, any inferences drawn from
this group could be misleading. Prospective pilots have no cultural basis upon which to
respond. That is, they have not experienced any of the factors native to the occupation
such as arduous sea duty and hazardous flying conditions. Their tastes for military
service are not yet fullv defined6 . Current force members, on the other hand, should
have sufficient exposure to behavioral and environmental factors peculiar to their
profession. Responses from individuals currently on active duty would provide valid
data with which to conduct multivariate analysis.
2. Geographic Considerations
Geographic location was a consideration in sample selection. At any given
time, Navy tactical pilots working in a flying billet are assigned to aircraft squadrons
located on both East and West coasts of the United States. The approximate
geographic allocation is one half to the East and one half to the West. Appendix B
provides a precise display of geographic distribution. To improve the questionnaire
5The effective date of P.L. 99-348 was August 1, 1986.
6
It would be akin to asking a truck driver, for instance, how he enjoyed working
as a brain surgeon.
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response rate, it was decided to hand-deliver the forms to squadrons, brief
administrators, and hand-collect completed surveys. These were extraordinary but
reasonable steps considering the traditionally poor response rate of mailed
questionnaires. It has been observed that significant problems arise from poor response
rates. If only a small percentage of mailed questionnaires respond, we can not be
certain the results represent all subsets of the larger population [Ref. 28].
3. Selection of the Sample Group
West-coast-based A-4, FA- 18, A-7, and F-14 pilots were selected as the
sample. There were two principal reasons for this. First, all West coast aircraft selected
are stationed at Naval Air Stations within California. The method of questionnaire
distribution (hand delivery) posed considerable limitations. Foremost was time and
funding. There was neither sufficient time nor money available for travel to East coast
facilities. Therefore, the sample was limited to air stations in California. Second, the
A-7, FA- 18, A-4, and F-14 are designated by the Navy as tactical aircraft.
4. The Randomness Requirement
In order for the sample group to be representative, the larger population is
defined to be West-coast-based Navy tactical pilots. This circumscription was
necessary because, by definition, random selection requires all in a population to have
an equal chance of being chosen. Implicit in the choice of West coast pilots is a
recognition that East coast pilots do not have an equal chance of being selected.
Satisfying the randomness requirement, therefore, guided the research population
definition.
The manner in which the study population was delineated supports the
external validity of the research design. Bracht and Glass [Ref. 29] explain this
position:
It is better to have reliable knowledge about restricted sets of circumstances than
to define the experimental population so broadly as to be uncertain about
inferences from the sample to the population.
F. THE INSTRUMENT
The design of the questionnaire centered on two objectives:
1. To elicit responses relevant to overall research objectives
2. To make completion easy.
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The primary aim of this research is to predict retention of Navy tactical pilots as a
function of change in retirement benefits by modeling individual behavior.
1. Avoidance of Bias
The dependent variable (retention) is constructed from a question that queries
pilots about their expected decision to stay or leave if they were serving under a law that
provided retirement benefits identical to those specified in the new law. Two elements of
this question are important. 7 First, the question was phrased to avoid describing the
retirement benefits as those of the new retirement law. If the respondents were told
that the benefits described were, in fact, provisions of P.L. 89-439, their answers may
not reflect true feelings but rather may indicate a protest towards what some may feel
is an erosion of compensation. This type of bias is like an inverse "Hawthorne Effect";
a phenomenon observed and described by Roethlisberger and Dickson [Ref. 30]. The
Hawthorne effect reflects distortion in behavior that occurs when people know they are
the subjects of a study.
2. Effects of Independent Factors
The second important element in construction was the need to determine what
factors other than retirement benefits may be influencing the respondent's decision. As
a general rule, any dependent variable being observed may be affected by the influence
of different factors and these variables may be related among themselves - sometimes
operating in the same direction, sometimes in opposite. For example, a Navy pilot's
decision to stay or leave may be influenced by a number of things. The officer
implicitly assigns varying weights to each influencing factor in making a decision.
Therefore, when querying a person about the impact of a specific policy the researcher
must identify the other factors and understand the strength of their influence. To that
end, a question was developed which asked a respondent to select from an array of
alternatives that reason which had the strongest influence on the decision to stay.
Table 2 shows this question.
3. The Taste Index
It was previously noted that econometric retention models vary widely in their
ability to model individual tastes for military service. Some neglected this factor
altogether while others attempted to capture tastes by assigning it a monetary value. In
this thesis, a numerical taste indicator (NTI) was developed using responses to a series
of questions pertaining to one's relative job satisfaction. This method was derived from
'See Appendix A for a complete description of this question.
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TABLE 2
INFLUENCES ON DECISION TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY
Question 3
Below are some reasons Navy tactical air pilots and NFO's may have
for remaining on active duty beyond their minimum obligated
service. If you have considered staying in the Navy beyond your
minimum obligated service, please circle one item number you reel
was the most important reason why you would remain on active duty.
1. Opportunity to travel
2. Amount of total pay
(includes base, sea, AOCP, BAQ, VHA, BAS, ACIP)
3. Opportunity for Command
4. Opportunity to fly tactical aircraft
5. Military benefits
(includes: medical, exchange, commissary, recreation,
space A travel)
6. Retirement Plan
7. Feeling of belonging to an elite organization
8. Stability of a Navy career
9. Find duty at sea rewarding
a similar question used in the 1978 DOD Survey of Officers and Enlisted Personnel
[Ref. 31] and with minor modifications is the same question used by Black and Ilisevich
[Ref. 32] to quantify the taste factor. Table 3 shows the taste question.
4. Demographic data and Policy Analysis
Demographic data is included in the questionnaire both to assist in
determining the relationship between the dependent variable (retention) and personal
characteristics and to provide a descriptive statement about the sample.
The need to understand what correlation may exist between effects of policy
changes and demographic structure is useful for those who develop policy. With a
better understanding of the effects of proposed policy changes on specific
subpopulations, decision makers are able to better estimate the economic and social
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TABLE 3
QUESTIONS USED TO DETERMINE TASTE INDEX
QUESTION 5
If you were to leave the service now and take a civilian job,
how do you think that job would compare to your present
military job in regard to the following work conditions?
1. The immediate
supervisors
2. Having a say in
what happens to
me
3. The chance for
interesting work
4. The work schedule
and hours of work
5. The job security









Civilian in a Civilian
job civilian job



















costs as well as benefits of decisions. For example, if the military had a policy to
increase the number of career minority officers and it was known that there was a
strong negative correlation between minority officer retention and overseas job
assignment, then any policy which failed to recognize that mapping could be
counterproductive in terms of stated objectives. This hypothetical example
demonstrates the extent to which inclusion of demographic data can be useful.
5. Pre-testing of the Questionnaire
Extensive pre-testing of the questionnaire was performed prior to distribution.
It is recognized widely that pre-testing is the most effective means of ensuring the
organization of the instrument is consistent with research objectives and the questions
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are clear and well understood [Ref. 33]. Through observation and personal interviews
during pre-test, any difficulties a respondent may have can be identified. This feedback
is used to evaluate what modifications, if any, may be necessary.
The instrument used in this research was pre-tested on twenty-one Navy
tactical pilots assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School. Ten of that group suggested
improvements and, as a result, some wording was modified. After the revision, a second
pre-test was done to ensure continued clarity.
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IV. MODEL SELECTION
To provide a reliable prediction of Navy pilot retention, an appropriate
econometric model had to be selected. Such a model would have to be capable of
providing justifiable estimaters as well as data in a form conducive to statistical
analysis.
Regression analysis has been used extensively in previous research. There are
several good reasons for this. Regression is capable of providing significant explanatory
power, especially through its multivariate capabilities; it is widely available in computer
routines; and it is relatively simple to interpret.
As part of the model selection process, a number of different models will be
discussed. Each will be evaluated on its usefulness in meeting the stated model
objectives.
A. LINEAR MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Research workers who wish to develop a model to predict a dependent output
from a series of known, exogenous inputs will frequently use linear multiple regression.
This form of analysis is concerned with modelling the relationship among the
independent variables. An accurate representation of such a relationship is useful in
two ways. First, it offers a powerful explanation of the dependent variable since few
phenomenon are products of a single cause. Second, the effect of a particular
independent variable is clarified for the possibility of distorting influence from other
independent variables is removed.
In the general multiple regression equation, the dependent variable is seen as a
linear function of more than one independent variable. The equation takes the form:
Y = a+P1X, + P2X2+PnXn
where
Y = the prediction calculated from the equation
a = the value of the intercept
P = the coefficient of independent variable n
X = the nth independent variable value
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1. Estimation by the Linear Model
The multiple regression equation quantifies the relationship between the
dependent variable and multiple independent variables. If the true relationships among
the variables were known precisely, the researcher could predict the outcome with great
certainty. It is because the true relationship is rarely known that approximations must
be generated from research data.
The regression equation coefficients, or parameters, are estimated by use of
the least squares principle. This method attempts to fit the regression equation to
observed data by minimizing the sum of the squares of prediction errors (SSE).
SSE = £(Y-K)2
where
Y = predicted value
K = observed value
(Y-K) = prediction error
Figure 4.1 Mathematical Basis of Least Squares Estimation.
The objective of least squares, therefore, is to select a straight line which
minimizes the sum of the squares of the errors (SSE). For a two-variable model, the
least squares notation is:
Y = a+^Xj + yC,
The least squares combination of values for the coefficients (a, b,, b
2 )
yields
less prediction error (smaller SSE) than other possible combinations of values.
2. The Continuous Dependent Variable Constraint
Use of multiple linear regression is based on an assumption that the dependent
variable is continuous. The use of estimates derived from linear regression where the
dependent variable is qualitative rather than continuous can lead to serious errors in
inference. For example, such estimates may seriously missestimate the magnitude of the
effects of independent variables and, further, the regression estimates will be highly
sensitive to the range of particular values observed for the independent variables. This
observed sensitivity will make forecasts beyond the range of data unjustified [Ref. 34].
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Use of qualitative dependent variables is important when analyzing individual
retention behavior. The decision to remain on active duty (stay) or resign (leave) is a
clear dichotomous choice. There can be no continuous behavior. The person either
stays or leaves. Thus use of the linear model may be inappropriate. What is needed,
therefore, are statistical techniques able to provide the type of information available
from multivariate regression but with the ability to display estimates based on binary
choices. Discriminant analysis and logistic regression are two methods that could be
useful.
B. DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
1. Usefulness in Prediction
The problem of forecasting attrition requires the researcher to determine who
will leave and who will stay. An intuitive strategy is to compare characteristics of a
pilot facing the stay or leave decision to those of pilots that have chosen to either
remain in the Navy or leave. Based on similarities or differences, a prediction can be
made. In essence, what the researcher attempts is to differentiate between two mutually
exclusive, or dichotomous. groups: those who stay and those who leave. The ability to
discriminate between the two groups is determined by a collection of variables
representing individual characteristics such as age, commissioning source, and ethnic
origin. What is known is variable values for pilots whose group membership is known.
Other useful information would include the significance level of chosen variables as
well as decision criteria necessary to predict group membership for those facing the
stay or leave decision. Discriminant analysis is a statistical procedure designed for this
problem.
2. How Discriminant Analysis Works
Discriminant analysis rests on a theory that specifies use of independent
predictor variables, in linear combination, as a basis for classifying cases into one of
two groups. Information contained in multiple independent variables is summarized in
a single index. For example, by finding a weighted average of variables such as age,
number of deployments, and flight hours, the researcher is able to obtain a score that
distinguishes between pilots remaining on active duty from those that do not.
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In discriminant analysis, the weights are estimated such that they result in the best
separation between groups. The linear discriminant equation is specified by:
D = P + P,X, + P2Xr ..pnXn
where
D = discriminant score
X = values of the exogenous variables
P = coefficients estimated from the data
If a linear discriminant function is to discern between pilots who stay and
those who leave, the two groups must differ in their D value. Therefore coefficients are
chosen so values of the discriminant function differ as much as possible between the
groups [Ref. 35]. These coefficients are referred to as canononical discriminant
function coefficients and can serve as a basis for classification of a pilot into one of
two categories.
C. THE LOGIT MODEL
In predicting retention, the focus should be on understanding determinants of
individual choice behavior. As such we are interested in the tendencies to make
expected choices, or probabilities. Because our retention choices are dichotomous (stay
or leave) the dependent variable is binary in form. The decision to stay can be
represented by 1; to leave by 0. As noted in the discussion of the linear model, there is
strong reason to believe the additive linear form with 2 dichotomous dependent
variables may provide poor probability approximations. Consider the following
probability model:
where
p = Prob(Y=i) = n;x)
P = probability of an event
Y = a dependent variable (the event predicted)
X = an independent variable
f(X) = cumulative probability function expressed






















Figure 4.2 The Logistic Distribution.
Several characteristics of f|X) suggest that it is non-linear. First, l\X) must lie
between 1 and (see Fig. 4.2). Thus, the relationship must be non-linear at the
boundaries otherwise discontinuities would result as the function was arbitrarily
confined within the limits. Finally, where there is more than one explanatory variable
the linear additive model seems inappropriate. At the least, one would expect some
interaction between variables; the marginal change in probability associated with a
given variable almost surely depends upon values of other explanatory variables
[Ref. 36]. The logistic distribution provides a means for dealing with these problems:
P = HX)
= 1/1 + e-px (eqn 4.1)
where
e = the base of natural logarithms
P = the probability that an individual will make a certain choice
X = an independent, explanatory variable
B = the coefficient associated with X
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The distribution ranges from to 1 as X goes from -so to + 00. Several aspects
of this function account for its usefulness. First, it has convenient mathematical
properties. Since
P = ll + e"PX , as in equation 4.1, then
1-P = e"PX/l + e"PX
= 1 l + ePX




where L = logit, or log of the odds ratio.
As P goes from to 1 (X goes from -00 to + 00), L goes from -00 to + 00 ; thus
while probabilities are bounded, the logits are unbounded with respect to the values of
the independent variables [Ref. 37]. This particular property of the logit model
addresses the functional discontinuity problem posed by linear models.
D. MODEL SPECIFICATION
1. Model Choice
Linear regression, discriminant analysis, and logit analysis have been arrayed
as possible vehicles able to provide reasonable estimation of the retention decision. The
linear model requires certain characteristics such as the continuous dependent variable
assumption that precludes its use here as a predictor model. Unlike discriminant
analysis, which postulates that observed values of individual characteristics are
drawings from posterior distributions conditioned on actual responses, logit proposes
that actual responses are drawings from binomial distributions with selection
probabilities conditioned on observed values of individual characteristics thus implying
that it is natural to specify choice behavior in terms of selection probabilities, or logit
analysis.
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2. Implications for Policy Makers
An important consideration for decision makers is the effect changes in
exogenous variables have upon the dependent variable. For example, manpower
planners might be interested in the responsiveness of retention probability to changes
in pay or non-pecuniary factors such as operating tempo. In the logit model, such
analysis is possible because the functional specification of probabilities is assumed not
to change. In the discriminant model, the relationship cannot be determined because
there is no specification of a possible relationship involving the dependent and
independent variables. [Ref. 38]
Thus the criterion for model specification is an ability to provide reasonable
estimaters and improve policy analysis utility through evaluation of retention




Retention is the dependent variable. It measures an officer's decision to stay in
service past minimum service requirement or leave. By assigning the value 1 to this
dichotomous variable the study focuses on those who stay rather than those who leave.
Previous research evaluated retention in the context of those who leave. Additional
knowledge may be gained by analyzing the opposite choice. For example, it may be
useful to know if factors thought to influence the stay decision are different from those
believed to influence the leave decision. Table 4 describes the variable coding.
1
.
Total Pay and Allowances
Pay is presented as a possible explanatory variable. Its inclusion represents an
acknowledgement that Navy tactical pilots, as with most people, are rational beings
motivated to a certain degree by monetary rewards for work. The pay variable
measures total pay and allowances including bonuses specific to the tactical air
community.
2. Opportunity for Command
Navy tactical aircraft exist to oppose enemy forces at sea and to carry the
battle ashore if need be. Command at sea of an operational unit is a dominant
prerequisite for promotion to flag (Admiral) rank and represents a pinnacle of
achievement in a competitive career. Many Navy officers see their command tour as a
necessary milestone on the road to flag rank. Others see it as the capstone of a
rewarding career. Thus the opportunity for command may be an influencing factor in
the retention decision.
3. Non-Monetary Military Benefits
Various non-monetary fringe benefits are available to service members. Such
benefits include unlimited free medical care for the member and his family. 8
Dependent medical care is by law on a space-available basis. If facilities are not
available, dependents are encouraged to use CHAMPUS, a government sponsored
health insurance program whereby dependents utilize civilian medical care. Premiums




DEFINITION OF MODEL VARIABLES
Variable Code
(RETN) Stated retention under 1 = stay
new retirement law = leave
(PAY) Pav is the primary reason 1 = ves
I would stay past MSR 0= no
(CMND) Opportunity for Command is 1 = yes
the primary reason I would stav = ho
past MSR
(FLY) Opportunity to flv tactical l = ves
jets is the primary reason'
I
= ho
would stay past MSR
(BEN) Benefits such as medical, l = yes
commissary, recreation, Space-A, 0=no
and exchange are the primary
reason I would stay past MSR
(RETR) Retirement plan is the primary l = yes
reason I would stay past MSR = no
(ELI) Feeling of belonging to an l = ves
elite organization is therpnmary 0=ho
reason! would stay past MSR
(STA) Job security as a Navy pilot 1 =yes
is the primary reason I would stay = no
past MSR







(AOCS) Aviation Officer Candidate
Other
= yes; 0, otherwise
= yes; 0, otherwise
= yes; 0, otherwise
= yes; 0, otherwise
= yes; 0, otherwise
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TABLE 4
DEFINITION OF MODEL VARIABLES (CONT'D.)
Variable Code
Aircraft Type
I am assigned to fly:
FA- 18 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
A-7E 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
F-14 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
A-4 (includes F-5) 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
Demographic Data
(MARRD) Married 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(DEPD) Dependents 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(ETHN) Ethnic Origin 1 = Caucasian; 0, otherwise
Rank
LTJG 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(LET) Lieutenant 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(LCDR) Lt. Commander 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(CDR) Commander 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(CAPT) Captain 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
Other
(SPOU) My spouse is employed 1 = yes; 0, otherwise
(TAST) Taste for military service scale from 1 to 5
(DEPY) I have participated in
a deployment over 3 months
1 =yes; 0, otherwise
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Commissaries-military supermarkets-are another benefit. Commissary prices
on a nationwide basis are about 20 percent lower than those prevailing in local
commercial grocery stores [Ref. 39]. Exchanges-military' department stores-represent
another non-monetary benefit although savings from exchange purchases are not
nearly as great as those from commissaries.
Another benefit is free worldwide travel (a S10 processing fee is charged) via
military aircraft on a space-available basis for the service member and his family. 9
Military recreation facilities represent another attractive benefit. Golf courses,
hobby shops, tennis facilities, swimming pools, theatres, and child care centers are
available at subsidized prices. The largest source of subsidies are profits from the
exchanges but regardless of the source, such subsidies should be recognized as non-
cash compensation. As such, they may represent a factor in the retention decision.
4. Retirement Benefits
Both monetary and non-monetary returns to a service member upon
retirement are major elements of the military7 compensation package. As such, any
changes to retirement benefits may affect retention. Including this factor into the
equation is important in evaluating what impact, if any, retirement pay has in the
retention decision. The first question in the survey questionnaire asks for a stay or
leave response in the context of altered retirement pay. The difficulty arises in
determining the strength of retirement pay relative to other factors in a respondent's
decision. By providing an array of possible determinants and asking the respondent to
place a value on each, it is conceptually possible to evaluate the strength of any
relationship between retention and each independent variable.
5. Job Security in a Navy Career
Military officers with a Regular commission earn tenure after reaching the 0-5
rank. Involuntary separation, except for reasons of cause, hasn't occurred to Navy
tactical aviators of any rank since de-mobilization following World War II. Thus it can
be said that Navy jet pilots have a de facto guarantee of a twenty year career. Such job
security may be viewed by these officers as an important part of the total
compensation package. Therefore, the extent to which respondents value job security
could have significant explanatory power in analyzing why some pilots stay and others
leave.
9Dependent travel is restricted to travel from the continental U.S. to overseas
destinations and return. Dependents must be accompanied by the service member when
traveling.
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6. Opportunity to Fly Tactical Aircraft
Psychic rewards associated with flying high-performance jet aircraft have long
been suggested as a reason jet pilots stay in the Navy. There has been little formal
research to substantiate this hypothesis, however. Opportunity to fly jets has been
added to this model as a variable. By including this factor, the nature of any
relationship may be more fully revealed.
7. Commissioning Source
Dummy variables were added to capture the effects of a pilot's commissioning
source on the probability of staying or leaving. Research by Cook [Ref. 40] suggests
that very little difference in retention can be explained by commissioning source.
Because the Cook study was performed six years ago, this variable was examined again.
Relationships may change over time.
The linkage between source and retention is important to policy planners. For
example, suppose commissioning source 'A' had an accession cost of S 100 and source
B' had a cost of S25. Further, suppose it was known that under a proposed pay
increase pilots from source 'A' had a greater likelihood than pilots from 'B' of resigning
at MSR. Using purely economic logic, increasing accessions from source 'B' relative to
source A' could possibly provide a lower cost solution to maintaining given force
levels beyond MSR.
8. Aircraft Type
As with commissioning source, dummy variables were established for most
types of Navy tactical aircraft. Evaluating retention probability under varying
compensation scenarios while controlling for aircraft type can provide useful
information. Department of the Navy aviation planners involved in long-range resource
allocation might be interested in relationships between pilots who fly specific aircraft
and retention. 10 Improved knowledge of this function could lead to a more efficient
mix of resources and to a more proactive response to changes in pay or benefits. For
example, if planners determined that under given a change in pay, F-14 pilots had a
greater likelihood of resigning at MSR than FA-18 pilots, a policy of accessing more
F-14 pilots relative to FA-18 pilots could prevent future shortages of F-14 pilots.
10This relationship is referred to as the labor supply function and is measured by
elasticity.
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9. Airline Hiring Rates
Airline hiring rates are thought to have a powerful effect on retention.
Kleinman and Zuhoski [Ref. 41] found Navy pilot attrition to increase when airline
hiring rates increase. These findings suggest that the Navy loses five pilots for every
three Navy pilots hired by the airlines.
In the development of this author's model, respondents were asked about the
influence airline hiring rates had on their decision to stay. Individual responses were
taken up in a variable designed to capture effects of commercial air hiring on retention.
10. Spouse Employment
The relationship between retention and spouse employment is a relatively
unexplored topic. Derr [Ref. 42] provides a rich analysis of this retention problem
aspect. He found cultural differences existing between junior (0-3)/midgrade (0-4)
officers and senior (0-5 + ) officers particularly regarding importance of the family unit.
Derr suggests that while senior officers tend to place job above family, junior and
midgrade officers are placing increasing emphasis on the importance of family over job.
Younger officers see their marriages more in terms of a partnership where each member
is encouraged to seek individual fulfilment and share equally in household tasks rather
than subjugating ones career aspirations to those of the other. If this analysis is
correct, the implications for officer retention may be significant, particularly in the
critical six to ten YOS period. In order to gather data on this subject, a dichotomous
response variable was included in the model.
11. Tastes
Because omission of the taste factor was seen as a shortcoming of other
models, it was included in this model. The numerical taste index described in Chapter
III was entered into the model as a continuous, independent variable. The index value
was derived from questions shown in Figure 3 . Respondents were asked to rate each
of six items on a scale of 1 (civilian job is best) to 5 (military job is best). Responses
were summed across the six questions and a total mean for each respondent was
obtained. A mean value of 3.00 could be interpreted as taste neutral; less than 3.00 as




The Navy pilot retention model developed in this thesis is estimated using non-
linear, maximum-likelihood estimation procedures. An assumption is made that the
probability of retention is given by the odds-ratio logistic function of a linear
combination of independent variables. The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) LOGIST
procedure was used to develop maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the exogenous
variables.
1 . Use of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Maximum likelihood is used rather than ordinary least squares estimation
because the logistic functional form is non-linear. The maximum likelihood procedure
has a number of desirable statistical properties. For large samples, parameter estimates
are consistent and asymptotically efficient [Ref. 43]. In addition, all parameter
estimates are known to be asymptotically normal, so appropriate statistical tests are
possible.
The LOGIST procedure computes MLE's by the Newton-Raphson method.
The model chi-square, its p-value, degrees of freedom, and an r statistic are displayed
as output for each model The model chi-square for each cumulative set of independent
variables is twice the difference in log likelihood of the corresponding model from the
likelihood based on the intercept only. It is the value:
model chi-square = r*(n-p)/(l-r) (eqn5.1)
where
p = number of parameters in the model including the intercept
n = number of observations
In the logistic transformation, the r statistic is equivalent to R2 in the linear
model, ranges between and 1, and provides a measure of a variable's contribution
independent of sample size.
2. Capability for Sensitivity Analysis
Policy analysts may find useful the ability to forecast the change in a
dependent variable resulting from change in an independent variable. This type of
analysis is available using logistic regression. Because the function is non-linear, the
slope can only be evaluated by taking derivatives of the coefficients. Each resulting
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value represents a first-order partial derivative which shows the effects of unit changes
in an explanatory variable on retention probability. A more detailed explanation of the
procedure and proofs can be found in Hanushek and Jackson [Ref 44].
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VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 5 shows a summary display of the aggregate, pooled, cross-sectional data
set. There were 302 observations drawn from 350 distributed questionnaires. The
response rate was 86 percent.
TABLE 5
AGGREGATE SAMPLE DATA
DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION
STEPWISE LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RETN WOULD STAY IN PAST MSR UNDER NEW LAW
302 OBSERVATIONS
226 RETN =
76 RETN = 1
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE
PAY 0.155629 1 1
CMND 0.072847 1 1
FLY 0.350993 1 1
BEN 0.026490 1 1
RETR 0.115894 1 1
ELI 0.036423 1 1
STA 0.049668 1 1
YOS 0.533113 1 1
NAVCAD 0.235099 1 1
ROTCR 0.195364 1 1
AVROC 0.165563 1 1
AOCS 0.350993 1 1
F18 0.288079 1 1
A7 0.324503 1 1
F14 0.274834 1 1
A4 0.112583 1 1
MARRD 0.662252 1 1
DEPD 0.711921 1 1
DEPY 0.860927 1 1
LET 0.609272 1 1
LCDR 0.268212 1 1
CDR 0.079470 1 1
AIRL 0.562914 1 1
SPOUSE 0.268212 1 1
TAST 2.825030 1.33 3.83 2.5
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Seven variables described in Chapter V were used in the model estimation to
indicate a respondent's most important reason for staying past MSR (PAY, CMND,
FLY, BEN, RETR, ELI, STA). Ranked by mean response, FLY (Opportunity to fly
tactical aircraft) had the highest score for the aggregate data. For the group as a whole
(stayers and leavers), the FLY variable was the most important factor. The mean
value 11 for FLY is .3509.
The mean for years of service (YOS) is .5331 which indicates the sample group is
equally distributed between pilots who have more or less than eight years of service.
However, the actual distribution is skewed slightly (.0331) toward the junior group.
Appendix E (page 83) provides a frequency summary of respondents by
commissioning source. Those officers commissioned from Aviation Officer Candidate
School (AOCS) are the best represented, while Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate
(AVROC) pilots were the least well represented. 12 Percentages of the total sample by
each commissioning source are: AOCS, 35%; Naval Academy, 23%; ROTC (regular),
19.5%; AVROC, 16.5%; and other, 5.3%.
Appendix E (page 84) is a summary of respondents by aircaft type. Pilots
assigned to fly A-7E jets were the largest sub-group of the sample. FA-18 and F-14A
pilots were about evenly distributed while pilots who fly A-4 jets were in a minority.
A-7E pilots were 32% of the total, while those who fly FA-18, F-14A, and A-4 aircraft
were 28.8, 27.4, and 11.3 percent, respectively.
Respondents sorted by rank were distributed similarly to the actual pilot
population. Appendix E (page 85) is a summary of how respondents are represented by
rank. Lieutenants (n = 184) were the largest group accounting for 61% of the total.
Next were Lieutenant Commanders (n= 81) with 27% while Commanders (n= 24) were
8%. Lieutenant Junior Grade Officers (3%) and Captains (1%) accounted for the
balance.
66 percent of sample respondents were married (n=200). 27 percent of the
group had spouses who worked outside the home and 99 percent of the respondents
were Caucasian. A large majority (86%) had been on deployments longer than three
months. The mean for the airline-hiring effect variable was .563. This finding suggests
11 The reader is reminded the range for these variables is to 1.
12Officers from "other" sources were the least represented in absolute terms.
Their small size (n= 16) relative to the larger sample size made this group less
important for analytical purposes.
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that more than 56 percent of the total group were influenced by the rate at which
airlines are procuring new pilots. The mean for the tastes variable was 2.825.
B. THE ESTIMATED EQUATION
The following LOGIT regression equation (eqn 6.1) was obtained from the cross-
sectional data set of 302 West-coast based Navy tactical pilots under study:
Ln{P/(l-P)} = -7.854 + 1.1832(PAY)
+ 2.8677(STA) + .8796(ROTCR)
-1.7929(AIRL) - 1.5185(SPOU)
+ 2.4793(TASTE) (eqn 6.1)
where
Ln = natural log
P = probability of retention past MSR
Table 9 presents coefficients for each parameter together with corresponding
standard error, chi-square, p value, and r value. The chi-square of the estimated
equation is significant and, with a p-value of .000, passes the test of model accuracy.
The 'c' index (fraction of concordant pairs of predicted probabilities and responses) is a
good way to assess a logistic model's predictive ability. This index measures from (no
ability) to 1 (perfect ability). In the equation, the 'c index is .866.
The estimated equation suggests that pay, job security, being commissioned from
ROTC, the rate of airline hiring, whether a spouse is employed, and taste for military
lifestyle increases the probability that a tactical pilot will remain beyond MSR. While
these variables have the strongest effects (1% level of significance), other factors have
an important, if somewhat less significant, contribution.
C. RETENTION PREDICTIONS
Retention is defined in two forms: minimum service requirement (MSR) plus two
years (MSR+2) and continuation rates. By the use of years of service (YOS) dummy




MODEL CHI-SQUARE= 97.10 WITH 6 D.F.
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITERATIONS.
MAX ABSOLUTE DERIVATIVES
. 5170D-05 .
MODEL CHI-SQUARE= 114.69 WITH 6 D.F.
(SCORE STAT.) P=0.0
R= 0.549
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR CHI-SQUARE p R
INTERCEPT -7 .80361297 1.38139267 31.91 0000
TAST 2 .48623652 0.44971654 30.56 0000 0.290
AIRL -1 .86346878 0.36199618 26.50 0000 -0.268
STA 2 .70555144 0.71646539 14.26 .0002 0.190
PAY 1 .16039265 0.45242503 6.58 0103 0.116
SPOUSE -1 .53375610 0.50332474 9.29 .0023 -0.146
ROTCR .86369012 0.43028735 4.03 .0447 0.077
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES
AND RESPONSES: 0.866
RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILITY AND RESPONSE :0 . 747
1. Minimum Service Requirement Plus Two (MSR+2)
The LOGIT model estimates that 25.17 percent of Navy tactical pilots serving
under the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 will continue on active duty beyond
MSR+2. This contrasts with a fiscal year (FY) 1986 MSR+2 rate of 46 percent and
is a reduction in retention of 45 percent.
2. Continuation Rates







C = Continuation rate in YOS cell r
L = Losses during the year in YOS cell r
N = Number in YOS cell r at beginning of the year
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Figure 6.1 shows a graphical display of the estimated continuation rates and
Appendix D has a complete listing of the rates.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE RETENTION DECISION
The decision to stay or leave was analyzed by aircraft type, marital status,
commissioning source, and rank.
Retention by aircraft type reveals that A-7E pilots have a greater probability
than others of staying past MSR. A-7E fliers represented 32.5 percent of all
respondents, yet accounted for 38.2 percent of those predicted to stay in the Navy.
A-4/F-5 pilots had the second greatest probability with 11.3 percent of responses and
11.8 percent of predicted stayers. FA-18 aviators had the third highest probability of
staying while F-14A pilots had the lowest of the group. Table 10 displays the data.
Retention by commissioning source indicates that tactical pilots accessed from
the Reserve Officers Training Corps (regular) had the greatest probability of retention.
ROTC aviators were 19.5 percent of the total but represented 25 percent of those
predicted to stay. Pilots commissioned from the Naval Academy had the second
highest chance. Naval Academy graduates were 23.5 percent of the total and were 23.7
percent of the predicted stayers. AOCS and AVROC sources were third and fourth,
respectively. Table 1 1 provides a tabular display of this dimension.
When examining retention by rank, it is clear that Captains and Commanders
have the highest probability of staying (see Table 12). For example, Commanders were
8 percent of the total and 13.2 percent of the predicted stayers. This finding is not
unexpected considering the increase in average tastes due to self-selection as officers
become more senior. What is surprising is the large numbers of senior officers who
would leave active duty at MSR despite high tastes. A more useful analysis of this
group would be to look at the percentage that are estimated to leave. For
Commanders, 58 percent would not stay. Lt. Commanders had a 64 percent chance of
leaving and Lieutenants had a 82 percent probability of not staying beyond MSR. The
observation that a large percentage of senior officers would leave despite high tastes is
related to a perceived decrease in monetary compensation. Officers with high tastes are
willing to trade-off some level of monetary compensation for other benefits. However,
if pay is thought to be eroding and other benefits remaining stable, the balance is
tipped and some officers with high tastes will leave. Apparently, this is the case with
the new retirement law. The evidence suggests that many senior officers surveyed felt a























































Figure 6.1 Estimated Continuation Rates.
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TABLE 10
RETENTION BY A IRCAFT TYPE
DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION




COL PCT LEAVE | STAY TOTAL
+ + +



















TOTAL 226 76 302
74.83 25.17 100.00
As shown in Table 13, single tactical pilots are more likely to leave than married
fliers. However, the converse is not always true. While married pilots as a whole have
a higher probability of staying than single aviators, married pilots whose spouses are
employed do not.
The impact of spousal employment was shown to be significant in the regression
equation. While pilots whose spouses were employed accounted for only 27 percent of
the sample, these same fliers represented 33 percent of the predicted leavers. This is
shown clearly in Table 14 .
The negative relationship between spouse employment and staying on active duty
may be related to assignment stability. This would be particularly true if a pilot's
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TABLE 11
RETENTION BY COMMISSIONING SOURCE
DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION













































TOTAL 226 76 302
74.83 25.17 100.00
spouse had a job specific to a certain geographic location. For these couples,
opportunity costs are associated with transfer orders. For example, if a spouses' job
prospects are thought to be poorer at the new location, the opportunity cost of being
transfered is high. This represents an economic cost to continued service on active
duty. All factors constant, this opportunity cost is a reduction in the income stream




DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION


























TOTAL 226 76 302
74.83 25.17 100
E. ANALYSIS OF THE AIRLINE FACTOR
1. Controlling for Commissioning Source
The results reveal that pilots commissioned from the Aviation Reserve Officer
Candidate (AVROC) source were the most likely to be influenced by airline hiring
rates. With 16.5 percent of the responses, AVROC pilots accounted for 19.4 percent of
those who said airlines affected their decisions. The least likely group to be influenced
are Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS) pilots. This group represented 35




RETENTION BY MARITAL STATUS
DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION
























2. Controlling for Aircraft Type
An examination of the airline factor by aircraft type indicates that F-14A
pilots are influenced proportionally greater than others. F-14A fliers were 27.4 percent
of the sample and 33.5 percent of the "influenced" respondents. FA- 18 pilots were
generally ambivalent, totalling 28.8 percent of the sample and 28.8 percent of the
"influenced" group. A-4 aviators were the least influenced by the attractions of
commercial aviation with 11 percent of the sample and 8.8 percent of those stating
they were influenced.
3. Controlling for Rank
Analysis of the airline factor by rank reveals that by far, Lieutenants are
influenced the greatest. Accounting for 61 percent of the sample, Lieutenants totalled
71.8 percent of the "influenced" category. Captains and Commanders were the least
influenced. If low sensitivity to airlines hiring rates is a proxy for job satisfaction, these
data provide further evidence that average tastes increase with YOS and results from
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TABLE 14
RETENTION BY SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT
DETERMINANTS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOT RETENTION
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the self-selection process. Those pilots who have low tastes and are strongly attracted
to commercial air have, by the time of eligibility for promotion to Captain, selected
themselves out of the Navy.
4. Controlling for Spouse Employment
The airline factor has a greater proportionate influence on the retention
decision of pilots whose spouses are employed than those whose spouses are not
employed. The former group accounted for 27 percent of the sample and 32 percent of
those "influenced" while the latter group was 73 percent of the sample and 67 percent
of those "influenced." This finding is intriguing but lacks a prima facie explanation.
Table 15 provides a summary for the airline factor.
F. EFFECTS OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES
1. Military Pay and Bonuses
The amount of pay, allowances, and bonuses a tactical pilot receives has a
strong effect on his likelihood of staying in service. Pay was found to be statistically
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TABLE 15
THE AIRLINE HIRING FACTOR
Controlling for C ommissioning Source
Source sample % influenced proportion
AVROC 16 19.4 21.3 %
ROTC 19 23 21.0 %
NAVCAD 23 24 4 %
AOCS 35 30 -14.0 %
Controlling for Aircraft Type
aircraft sample % influenced proportion
F-14A 27.4 33.5 22.2 %
FA- 18 28.8 28.8 0.0 %
A-7E 32.0 28.8 -10.0 %




sample % influenced proportion
61.0 71.8 17.0 %
LTJG 3.0 3.5 16.0 %
LCDR 27.0 20.5 -24.0 %
CAPT 1.0 .6 -43.0 %
CDR 8.0 4.1 -49.0 %
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significant at the 1 percent level. Evaluated for pilots on the margin (prob = .5), a one
percent increase in pay is estimated to increase retention probability by 0.30 percent.
2. Job Security
In absolute terms, job security has the largest influence of all factors examined
on predicted retention. Significant at the 1 percent level, job security is the most
important reason tactical pilots serving under the new retirement law may have for
staying in the Navy. This is an important finding because prior research has not
identified this factor as significant to the retention decision. Positive coefficients
suggest that as a pilot's perceived job security improves, the likelihood of this person
being retained also improves.
3. Commissioning Source
Of all commissioning sources examined, officers from the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) have the largest positive tendencies to being retained past
MSR. The ROTC coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. Sensitivity analysis
reveals a one percent increase in officers commissioned from ROTC will yield a 0.23
percent increase in retention when evaluated at MSR+2 retention rates. No other
commissioning source met the 10 percent significance level criterion for inclusion into
the model.
4. Airline Hiring Rates
As might be expected, the rate at which airlines are hiring new pilots has a
significant (1%) effect on estimated retention. The coefficient is negative (-1.853) which
indicates an inverse relationship between airline hiring and retention of pilots who will
serve under the new retirement law. The evidence further suggests that a Navy pilot's
attraction to commercial aviation has two dimensions: tastes (job satisfaction) and
pay. For example, in 1986, airline hiring rates increased albeit at lower average starting
salaries while tactical pilot retention decreased. The fact that many Navy pilots are
willing to accept the same, or in some cases lower, airline pay relates to job
satisfaction. For pilots with low tastes, higher Navy pay will not provide sufficient
inducement to stay. 13
13 For a concise analvsis of the Navy and airline pay comparability issue, see
Henderson and Kriegel (ref'45).
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5. Spouse Employment
The employment of a tactical pilot's spouse outside the home has a strong
inverse relationship to retention. The coefficient of -1.534 is significant at the 1 percent
level and indicates that, for the pilot at the margin (prob=.5) whose spouse is
employed, there is a 0.38 percent higher likelihood of his leaving at MSR than marginal
pilots whose spouses are not employed leaving at MSR.
6. Tastes
A tactical pilot's tastes for the military has the second largest influence on
retention of all factors examined. Significant at the 1 percent level, tastes can make a
large impact on retention relative to other factors. The coefficient of 2.4862 is
positively correlated. This suggests that as a person's tastes for military service rise, the
probability of his staying past MSR also rises. The retention elasticity with respect to
tastes is 3.92. This means that for a 1 percent increase in job satisfaction, retention
rates could be expected to rise nearly 4 percent, all other factors remaining constant.
To the extent that the taste variable is a proxy for pilot job satisfaction, Navy
policy makers can positively influence retention rates by altering certain aspects of the
job. For example, the difficult conditions associated with extended carrier deployments
have been recognized as detriments to retention. Consequently, the Secretary of the
Navy has taken steps to reduce carrier operating tempo [Ref. 46]. A tabular display of
the tastes factor by commissioning source, aircraft type, and rank is shown in
Appendix F.
7. Opportunity to Fly Tactical Aircraft
Opportunity to fly tactical aircraft failed to meet the 10 percent significance
level criterion for inclusion into the model. This variable, it could be interpreted, will
exert less influence on those serving under the new retirement law than other factors
will. For the entire sample (stayers and leavers), opportunity to fly tactical aircraft was
the most frequently given reason for staying; for the stayers, however (n=76), it was
less important than job security and total monetary compensation.
14
Elasticities evaluated at the 1986 Navy tactical pilot retention rate of 46%
(MSR+2).
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Retention rates have been estimated for Navy tactical pilots who will serve under
the provisions of the Military Retirement Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-348). Estimation was
done by the LOGIST procedure which fits the logistic multiple regression model to a
single binary dependent variable. Maximum likelihood estimates were computed by the
Newton-Raphson method. The LOGIST procedure was chosen as the estimation
model after critical review of the PPM, PVCOL, ACOL, and DRM methodologies.
Data were obtained from a cross-sectional random sample (n=302) of West-
coast based Navy Tactical pilots. Retention estimates for both minimum service
requirement plus two years (MSR + 2) and continuation rates (1-loss rate) were
provided. Estimating retention rates satisfies the first research objective described in
Chapter III. Another research objective was to evaluate determinants of Navy tactical
pilot retention. Taste for military service, pay, job security, commissioning source, and
spouse employment were found to have statistically significant effects on a tactical
pilots's retention decision.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions presented in this section result from analysis of data drawn from the
Navy tactical pilots survey described in Chapter III.
Conclusion 1: The Military Retirement Act of 1986 will have a negative impact on
Navy tactical pilot retention. This conclusion is predicated on existing civilian- military
pay ratios, operational tempo, and quality-of-life factors remaining constant. The
negative impact will be felt directly beginning in 1992 for the 1986 entering cohort.
Spillover effects may be felt sooner. For example, current pilots who are on the margin
may see the new law as a signal that their compensation package is under
Congressional attack. Barring improvements in other areas, this implied threat may
induce these undecided officers to leave.
Conclusion 2: Tactical pilot accession levels can be expected to begin rising
significantly by the end of the decade given current or higher force requirements. As
retention rates begin to drop first reflecting spillover and then direct effects, higher
accession levels will be necessary to maintain force levels.
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Conclusion 3: Tactical pilot accession funding requirements will increase as higher
accessions enter the training pipeline. Financial costs will be felt more strongly in the
tactical air community than others given higher marginal training costs for tactical
aviators.
Conclusion 4: Non-monetary factors will have a greater impact on retention than
monetary factors given current civilian-military pay ratios. Perceived job security will be
important in maintaining acceptable continuation rates. This conclusion is reasonable
considering that officers serving under the new law will be evaluating a trade-off
between job security and earnings stream. If future earnings are expected to decrease
(lower retirement pay), rational tactical pilots will demand higher levels of job security
as an inducement to stay. The evidence in this research strongly suggests that for the
pilot on the margin, job security is valued more than any other factor. If one accepts
this finding, it is logical to argue that discussions by higher authority which are
perceived to be threats to job security will reduce retention. For example, reductions in
force of regular officers could be seen as a threat to job security. As such it can be
expected to reduce retention.
Conclusion 5: Tactical air retention will continue to be sensitive to airline hiring
rates. The evidence suggests that a tactical pilot's monetary compensation has risen
enough in the last Five years to provide an adequate level of economic satisfaction
given average tastes distribution. Therefore, the economic incentives of leaving to join
the airlines are not so great as they once were. However, for those with low tastes, the
non-monetary attractions of commercial aviation will continue to be enticing.
Conclusion 6: Spouse employment will continue to have a negative impact on
retention. The number of two-income marriages is increasing, and Naval aviation, like
other sectors of society, will continue to feel the impact of this social force. Because of
opportunity costs associated with transfers, increasing levels of spousal income will
exacerbate the negative impact of spouse employment on retention.
Conclusion 7: Bonus levels must remain fully funded if current or higher tactical
force levels will be required. Bonuses are used to retain pilots with low tastes.
Therefore, imbedded in current retention rates are lower average taste levels than
would exist if prior bonuses had not been paid. Stated simply, because a certain
percentage of retention is tied to these temporary inducements (bonuses), higher exit-




1986 Navy Tactical Air Survey
The ability to attract and retain qualified tactical air pilots and NFO's is a matter
of high priority to Navy Manpower planners. This survey is a key element of research
being conducted for a Masters Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. Data collected
will be used to evaluate how alternative policies may affect individual career decisions.
Results of this research will be reviewed by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
and may lead to improved pay and quality of life initiatives in the future. This
questionnaire is being distributed to a sample of Naval Aviators and Flight Officers.
Please read the instructions below.
NOTICE
This survey is anonymous. Information you provide will be grouped with that of
the other participants and provisions of the Privacy Act will be enforced. Please do not
write your name on the questionnaire.
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You are encouraged to provide
complete and accurate information, but you are not required to answer any question
you consider objectionable.
Your responses to this survey will be aggregated and used to prepare a statistical
report. Summary results of this survey will be provided to each squadron upon
completion.
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Suppose the Armed Forces had a different retirement plan in effect at the time you
first entered active dutv. Under this new plan, people who remain in the military for 20
years or more would receive the following benefits:
1. For twenty years of service, retirement benefits will equal 40% of the
average' pay for the highest three years of basic pay.
2. The percentage of basic pav will increase 3.5% per year after 20, up to a
maximum of 75% at 30'years.
In Addition:
3. Inflation Protection
Annual, cost, of living increases for retired pay will be held to 1% below the
annual inflation rate. At age 62. however, the retiree will set a one-time increase
to restore purchasine power lost to inflation. After that, the cost of living
adjustments will again be 1% less than inflation.
The plan described above represents an approximate twenty percent decrease in
benefits from the plan that most active duty military members now serve under.
QUESTION I
If the benefits described above had been available at the time you entered active
dutv, and all operational and quality of life factors were held constant at today's level
(such as airline hiring rates, deployment tempo, pay/bonus levels, etc), would you have
stayed on active duty past your obligated servicer
(please circle response)
Yes No
If the answer to the above is Yes, how many years from date of commissioning would
you have stayed?
answer:
If you are not planning to remain on active dutv bevond your minimum obligated
service, please DO NOT answer questions 2 and 3. Skip to question 4.
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Question 2
How important are the following factors in making your decision to remain on active

















7. Feeling of belonging
to an elite group
8. Job security in a
Navy career.
9. Rewards and challenges
of duty at sea.
y moderately somewhat slightly not






Question 3 Below are some reasons Navy tactical air pilots and NFO's may have for
remaining on active dutv bevond their" minimum ooliaated service. If you have
considered staving in the "Navy beyond your minimum obligated service, please circle
one item number you feel was the most'' important reason why you would remain on
active duty.
1. Opportunity to travel
2. Amount of total pay (includes base, sea, AOCP, BAQ, VHA, BAS, ACIP)
3. Opportunity for Command
4. Opportunity to fly tactical aircraft
5. Military benefits (includes: medical, exchange, commissary, recreation,
space A travel)
6. Retirement Plan
7. Feeling of belonging to an elite organization
8. Stability of a Navy career




A. Years of service (to the nearest month)
answer:
.
B. Commissioning source (circle one):
1. Naval Academy 2. ROTC (regular) 3. ROTC (contract)
4. AOCS 5. AVROC 6. Other
C. Type of aircraft you are presently assigned to fly:
answer: .
D. Marital Status (circle one):
1. Married 2. Not married
E. Number of dependents: .
F. Number of deployments you have made while on active duty that were
greater than three months in duration.
answer:
G. Your current rank
H. What is your ethnic identity? (circle one)
1. Black. 2. Hispanic 3. Caucasian 4. Oriental 5. Other
I. Do you have prior enlisted service? (circle one)
1. Yes 2. No
J. What impact does the rate at which airlines are hiring have upon your
decision to remain on active duty? (circle one)
1. Has impact
2. Has no impact
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K. If married, does your spouse work fulltime outside the home? (circle
one)
1. Yes 2. No
L. If you have children, are any of school-age? (circle one)
1. Yes 2. No
M. Aviation designator (circle one)
1. Pilot 2. NFO
N. Are you phvsicallv qualified in all respects to fly for a licensed air
carrier (circle one)
1. Yes 2. No
QUESTION 5
If you were to leave the service now and take a civilian job, how do you think that job









Civilian in a Civilian Civilian
job civilian job job
would be and would be would be
slightly
better




2. Having a say in
what Happens to
me
3. The chance for
interesting work
4. The work schedule
and hours of work
5. The job security




GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TACTICAL PILOTS
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOTS BY AQD
AND STATE AS OF 8606




COL PCT A-4 |A-7 F-4 F-1410
0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00









































































































+ + + +
GA 1
0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
GQ 1 3
0.06 0.17 0.00 0.00
25.00 75.00 0.00 0.00
1.08 0.34 0.00 0.00
HI 10 9 9 5
0.58 0.52 0.52 0.29
30.30 27.27 27.27 15.15
10.75 1.03 6.16 0.82
IL 1 1
0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00
0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00

































FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOTS BY AQD
AND STATE AS OF 8606





COL PCT A-4 |A-7 | F-4
I
F-14
MD 3 14 4 13
0.17 0.81 0.23 0.76
8.82 41.18 11.76 38.24
3.23 1.61 2.74 2.12
MA 10
0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
MN 10
0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00































































































































































FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NAVY TACTICAL PILOTS BY AQD
AND STATE AS OF 8606
























h + + +
1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00


































































































VA 8 49 37 235
0.46 2.85 2.15 13.65
2.43 14.89 11.25 71.43
8.60 5.63 25.34 38.40
WA 1 1 2
0.06 0.06 0.12 0.00
25.00 25.00 50.00 0.00





































































LABEL RETN=' WOULD STAY IN PAST MSR UNDER NEW LAW'
LABEL PAY='PAY IS MOST IMPORTANT REASON TO STAY'
LABEL CMND=' OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMAND IS WHY I STAY'
LABEL FLY=' OPPORTUNITY TO FLY JETS IS WHY I STAY'
LABEL RETR=' RETIREMENT PAY IS WHY I STAY IN 1
LABEL ELI=' BEING IN AN ELITE GROUP IS WHY I STAY 1
LABEL STA='JOB STABILITY IS WHY I STAY'
LABEL YOS=' YEARS OF SERVICE'
LABEL NAVCAD=' COMMISSIONING SOURCE: NAVAL ACADEMY'
LABEL ROTCR=' COMMISSIONING SOURCE: ROTC (REGULAR)'
LABEL AVROC=' COMMISSIONING SOURCE: AVIATION ROC
LABEL AOCS=' COMMISSIONING SOURCE: AVIATION OCS
'
LABEL MARRD=' MARITAL STATUS'
LABEL DEPD=' NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS'






LABEL CAPT= ' RANK : CAPTAIN"
LABEL AIRL=' AIRLINE HIRING INFLUENCES MY DECISION'
LABEL SPOUSE='MY SPOUSE WORKS OUTSIDE OUR HOME'
LABEL TAST=' TASTE FOR MILITARY SERVICE'
LABEL COMSOU=' COMMISSIONING SOURCE'/





IF TAST>0 & TAST<3 THEN TASTGRP==1,
t
ELSE IF TAST=3 THEN TASTGRP=-2;
ELSE IF TAST>3 THEN TASTGRP== 3;
CARDS
;
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.8310010000000100010011100010100 3.83
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.80
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.10
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.60 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.60 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.91 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.33 1
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 3.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.86 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.16 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.33
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.55
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.50 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.50
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.66
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.12 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.33 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.00 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.83
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.63
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.10 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.90 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.88 1
































1. RESPONDENT BY COMMISSIONING SOURCE



















































2. RESPONDENT BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
































3. RESPONDENT BY RANK



































































COL PCT LTJG |CAPT | CDR | LCDR | LT | TOTAL
________________j- ! -L -I J J.
FAVORS CIVILIAN 4 1 5 38 129 177
1.32 0.33 1.66 12.58 42.72 58.61
2.26 0.56 2.82 21.47 72.88
44.44 25.00 20.83 46.91 70.11
6 14 22 42
0.00 0.00 1.99 4.64 7.28 13.91
0.00 0.00 14.29 33.33 52.38
0.00 0.00 25.00 17.28 11.96
NEUTRAL
______ — _ _ _ _ _ — «« —
-t-
FAVORS MILITARY 5 3 13 29 33 83
1.66 0.99 4.30 9.60 10.93 27.48
6.02 3.61 15.66 34.94 39.76
55.56 75.00 54.17 35.80 17.93
TOTAL 9 4 24 81 184 302
2.98 1.32 7.95 26.82 60.93 100.00
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COL PCT A4 IF14 |A7 F18 TOTAL
+ + + _ + +
FAVORS CIVILIAN 16 44 56 61 177
5.30 14.57 18.54 20.20 58.61







NEUTRAL 10 7 42
2.65 5.63 3.31 2.32 13.91







m m m« * m —4-
8.05
FAVORS MILITARY 32 19 83
3.31 7.28 10.60 6.29 27.48
12.05 26.51 38.55 22.89
29.41 26.51 32.65 21.84
TOTAL 34 83 98 87 302
11.26 27.48 32.45 28.81 100.00
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NEUTRAL 1 13 5 21 2
0.33 4.30 1.66 6.95 0.66
2.38 30.95 11.90 50.00 4.76
6.25 12.26 10.00 35.59 2.82
FAVORS MILITARY 5 30 13 11 24
1.66 9.93 4.30 3.64 7.95
6.02 36.14 15.66 13.25 28.92
















5. TASTES BY STATED RETENTION





























6. TASTES BY SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT
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